Abstract-Security policies are a key component in protecting enterprise networks. There are many defensive options available to these policies, but current mechanically-enforced security policies are limited to traditional admission-based access control. There are defensive capabilities. given an initial configuration provided by the administrator. Using a vari-web server and database (htaccess and grant tables, respecety of actuators, we make the full array of defensive capabilities available tively). Each of these policies is evaluated by the corresponding to the global policy. We outline our proposal for enterprise-wide security policies, explore the design space, and discuss Arachne, our prototype im-app ication, with no Input from the other network entities, even plementation.
though that input might sometimes be highly relevant, as we shall see shortly. Additionally, there are many defensive capa-I. INTRODUCTION bilities available to this network, including using the firewall to
Modem security policiesareinflex. .e applications make assumptionsontebehavior so mechanisms that allow for escalating the response to an attack oth inatis case the sur pol at the berver must -but policy enforcement is essentially limited to allow/deny se-others. In thls case, the securaty policy at the web server must mantics. ĩ~~~~~~m p l i c i t l y assume that all of its traffic has arrived through the mantics. Furthermore, traditional access-control mecfirewall. An attacker can compromise the system by bypassing Furthermore, traditional access-control mechanisms uusedmin the firewall, through insider knowledge (gaining access to a loWhenterpriserissuesarequesttoa networksoperden n thea service.s cal machine) or through an open wireless access point. He can When a user issues a request to a network service, the service s te rb h e evrssrpsfr a,SLijcinvl access-control mechanism independently uses its security pol-.nerabe with impunity The fire vrfe thatneach pake icy to make a decision on how to handle the request then goes it sees conforms to its security policy, but the attacker's misbeinactve. Theretmay be information r ant totheudeconsels-havior goes unnoticed. There is no way for the web server to dewhere in the network, but the decisionmis madeawthu c t-termine that an incoming request has been vetted by the this system to be viable, it must improve the security of the net-2. Requests are only processed by the web server if they pass work, be capable of scaling to enterprise network sizes, have a through the firewall. minimal impact on performance, and be straightforward for a 3. Requests are only processed by the database if they come system administrator to install and to define policies. from the web server, and are authenticated.
We model the system by dividing it into four major types of 4. If a request fails authentication at the database, the firewall components (as shown in Figure 2 generating a "passed through the firewall" event. The request Events An event is any action performed by an application that then arrives at the web server, generating another event. The may be relevant to some policy decision. Examples of events in-policy determines that this request is allowed under Rule 2, beclude authenticating a user, initiating a network connection, and cause it can verify that the request has passed through the firerequesting a file. Events may be positive or negative; a firewall wall (having seen the previously generated events). The file rejecting a connection is an event.
index . html has dynamic content, so the request must authenPolicy A list of objectives, rules for behavior, requirements, and ticate at the database, and then make the appropriate query. Each responses, whose goal is to ensure the security of the network. step generates a new event and is evaluated by the policy along An example policy: all incoming requests must connect on port the way. If authentication fails at the web server, the policy uses 80 and may only requestfiles named index. html. The global an actuator on the firewall to cut off the request and prevent it policy may be distributed across multiple network nodes.
any further access to the network. Under a traditional security Actuators An actuator is a program which modifies application policy, the database might be able to lock out the request, but behavior after being triggered by a policy. An actuator might the attacker would be allowed to continue probing the rest of the close a port on a firewall, turn on logging on a file server, redirect network.
requests to a web page, or activate an intrusion detection system.
III. DESIGN
The is the policy enforcement point.
A network, consisting of applications and network links, is
To attain the goals of this system, we must address several observed by the sensors, each generating events in response to design-related questions. Every design choice has trade-offs in requests. Events are evaluated by the policy, which makes deci-performance, scalability, and so on. In this section, we discuss thoughts on answering them. misbehaves, we deduct from the trustworthiness. More serious Which events are noteworthy? Any action taken by an appli-misbehavior leads to larger deductions. cation (or even a non-action) could be relevant to some policy I. ARACHNE decision. It requires intimate knowledge of the application to determine which actions are truly relevant. Thus, each sensor We will now describe Arachne, our prototype implementamay require customization for the specific application it is ob-tion. Arachne is written in C and Python, and it consists of serving. five major components: sensors, principals, an event database, How do we organize events? Event broadcasting and retrieval a behavior-based policy engine, and actuators. We will discuss can be viewed as a publish/subscribe system [1] . However, with each in turn. the potential for thousands of sensors, each generating thousands of events per minute, it is imperative that only noteworthy A. Sensors events are delivered to specific policy components. One possiArachne sensors are small programs scattered around the netbility, which we will explore in Section IV is to aggregate events work that generate events corresponding to observed network through groups of like interest, based on the idea of a session. and application behavior. Each sensor is customized for the parWe informally define a session as the collection of events gener-ticular application or network link it is observing. As we will see ated by all services in the process of handling a specific request. in Section IV-C, a sensor must be configured with some knowlBeyond filtering on sessions, it may be desirable to filter on edge of the local network topology. users, target services, or other types of events, thus creating channels for specific users, specific services, or specific service B. Principals types (e.g., any event related to any file server). Filters like this
The term principal has different meanings for different commake it possible for the system to detect, for example, extremely ponents in a network. At the network layer, it may be slow port scans, or misbehavior by a particular user.
an IP address. For one application, a principal may be a
Where is the policy enacted? The policy engine may be a (username, password) pair. For another application, a prinsingle centralized entity, or it may be distributed across multi-cipal may be a public/private key pair. That is, the definition of ple components. A centralized policy server may not scale, but principal is application-specific. with fully distributed policy decision-making and enforcement, However, Arachne must be principal-agnostic, which is it may be more difficult to administer and to define new poli-achieved through sensor customization. Sensors must already cies. The latter case may be alleviated by centralizing the policy be customized on a per-application basis. When a sensor is cusmanagement while maintaining a distributed policy engine. Recall that one of the design questions for this system is how the the global mechanism steps in to make corrections.
to manage the volume of events that will be generated by the How is the policy abstracted? That is, what abstraction do we sensors. Regardless of whether all events are stored in a cenuse as the basis for enacting the policy? Modern access control tral database or distributed, the volume requires some method models include access control lists (ACLs) and, more recently, for organization. In Arachne, we organize the events using two role-based access control (RBAC). We believe neither is appro-components: a primary MySQL database for storing events, and priate in this architecture. Consider a scenario where each in-a custom database for linking events into sessions. The primary coming request is assigned a role from a pre-defined list. Each database allows for queries such as "list all events with a destirole has a set of services it is allowed to access. If the request nation port of 22." misbehaves on the web server, we may wish to remove the web A session is a graph G = (V, E) where the vertices V are server from the set of services to which the request is allowed a set of events and the edges E are causality links between access, essentially changing the request's role to a new role with them. In general, there is no method for identifying causality, more limited access. Since a new role is required for every pos-but sensors distributed through the network can be used to build sible subset of services we may wish to allow for a request, the a causality graph that closely approximates the graph that would list of roles will quickly become unwieldy. Thus, some other be built with total knowledge. We use sensors with local knowlmechanism is required.
edge to generate special linkage events that indicate causal links As we will explore in more detail in Section IV, we propose between normal events. a simple metric. For each session, we maintain a value estiFor example, a TCP connection arrives at a firewall from mating the trustworthiness of that session -a simple weighted some IP:port (so the firewall sensor generates an incoming con- Each principal ID is retained in long-term storage in the event service all the other users behind the NAT by misbehaving and database, along with a behavioral score. Every principal starts driving down the score. This problem is handled by the forgivewith a score of 100, and that is also the maximum score. When ness server, described in Section V-B.
events with non-zero penalty values are associated with the prin-A related situation is the case where multiple principals are cipal (by being linked through sessions) that value is deducted controlled by a single hidden individual, such as the case of a from the principal's score.
botnet. In this case, we make use of IDS sensors which are
The penalty value for a given event is application-specific. able to detect, for example, DDoS attacks and multi-source port For one application, a failed password is relatively unimportant, scans, and generate a "meta-principal" with linkages to the prinresulting in a small penalty, while for another it is significant cipals performing the attack. Thus, each small transgression should result in a large penalty. Sensors are already customized taken by the individual principals is also deducted from the score on a per-application basis, and it is a simple matter to store the of the meta-principal and the group as a whole is punished. application-specific penalty values for each class of event at the sensor as well. When a sensor generates an event, it attaches the B. Forgiveness server penalty value before sending it to the event database. Similarly, As described, our system can only get more restrictive over actuators are locally customized to trigger for a specific range of time. To allow for relaxation of a principal's score, we introa session's score.
duce the notion of a forgiveness server. Any time a principal
Over the lifetime of a session, the scores for each principal is blocked by an actuator from taking some action, they are inlinked to that session are modified based on the penalty values structed (or redirected automatically, depending on context) to of the events generated. We treat each session as having the visit the forgiveness server. The forgiveness server is a web score of the lowest scoring principal linked to it, but we are re-server that examines the score of the incoming principal and, searching more sophisticated heuristics.
based on its value, makes the principal perform whatever actions are necessary to bring the score back to 100. For example: F. Actuators . To be forgiven a score of 95, the principal must reply to an Each actuator is associated with a scoring range for which automated email. that actuator should trigger. When a session enters that scor-. To be forgiven a score of 75, the principal must submit his/her ing range, the actuator triggers. Consider an actuator which in-SSN.
creases the log level for sessions in the scoring range of 0-95. . To be forgiven a score of 50, the principal must fill out a form If a session with a score of 100 fails a password auth, generat-explaining his/her behavior and submit his/her credit card numing an event with a penalty value of 10, the session score will ber.
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United States Military Academy, West Point, NY 20-22 June 2007 To be forgiven a score of 10, the principal must talk to a sys-access control. Each principal is assigned one [14] , [15] , and distributed enforcement [16] , [17] .
values and then fine-tunes them to correctness. This is only fea-
In their work in the field of trust management, Blaze, et sible if the session-and-actuator-response package is isolated. al., [18] , [19] , [20] built PolicyMaker, a tool that takes a uniThat is, an actuator response can only affect a single session; if fied approach to describing policies and trust relationships in it affects multiple sessions, then it is possible to cause a cascade enterprise-scale networks by defining policies based on credenwhere a session generates an event which triggers an actuator tials. It is based on a policy engine that identifies whether some which generates an event which triggers another actuator, etc.
request r with credentials c complies with policy p. In Policy-
To prevent these cascades, we disable events generated as a Maker, policies are defined by programs evaluated at runtime. result of an actuator and allow actuators only to affect a single SPKI [21] , [22] , [23] is a similar mechanism that uses a formal session. This reduces the broadness of our system (by limiting language for expressing policies. In both cases, the focus is on the abilities of the actuators) but it prevents catastrophic errors. trust management rather than policy correctness.
The session-and-actuator-response is isolated so that a misconBonatti, et al., [24] propose an algebra for composing hetfiguration or other error in a single session will not affect other erogeneous security policies. This is useful in networks with sessions. As long as the configuration is correct for a given ses-multiple policies defined in multiple languages (i.e., most netsion, that session will continue to be handled, even if some other works today). However, this system requires that all policies session is configured incorrectly.
and supporting information and credentials be available at a sinThe key is that misconfigurations and errors are always pos-gle decision point. sible, but by isolating the effects of those mistakes, the system When there are multiple policies or multiple users defining itself continues to operate. policy there is always the possibility of conflict [15] . The prob-VI. RELATED WORK lem is exacerbated in large-scale networks.
The STRONGMAN trust management system [25] focuses In existing services, the access-control mechanism operates on the problem of scaling the enforcement of security polias a gatekeeper. When a principal makes a request, the access-cies and resolving policy conflicts. In STRONGMAN, highcontrol mechanism consults a security policy, makes a decision, level, abstract security policies are automatically translated into and goes inactive. The access-control mechanism (and hence, smaller components for each service in the network. However, the security policy) is not consulted again, regardless of any fu-in STRONGMAN, if some base assumption in the high-level ture actions taken by that principal. This style of access control policy is violated, there is no way for the individual components was first described by Lampson [2] , [3] , and refined by Gra-to detect or recover.
ham and Denning [4] . Their work provided the basis for speciPonder [26] and SPL [27] are policy languages that avoid fying security policies in the form of the access control matrix, policy conflicts by depending on a unique namespace for all from which the widely used access control list (ACL) is derived. ways guaranteed to be operating on the same object, regardless < subject, object, access rights> of where in the system the rule is interpreted.
Firewalls [28] , [29] are one of the most common and most that define the security policy for the system -which subjects well-known mechanisms for policy enforcement. However, have which access rights on which objects.
nearly all firewall research has focused on isolated firewall
ACLs do not scale well in all cases, so in large-scale networks nodes and the specifics of the enforcement mechanisms, rather they are often replaced by role-based access control (RBAC) [5] , than policy coordination. [6] , [7] . RBAC is now the predominant model for advanced
The Oasis architecture [30] takes a wider view and uses a role-
